講座題目：A Co-Opetitive Game Analysis of Platform Compatibility Strategies Under Add-on Services
主講嘉賓： 李武 (Kevin W. Li)
時 間：2023年6月13日（星期二）上午9：30—11：30
地 點：商學院116東方廳
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江南大學商學院
2023年6月8日
主講嘉賓簡介
李武(Kevin W. Li)博士,加拿大溫莎大學Odette商學院管理科學教授。主要研究方向包括供應鍊管理、決策理論與方法以及沖突分析等。研究獲得三項加拿大自然科學與工程研究基金會發現基金項目的支持，同時也多次得到國家教育部春晖計劃短期項目支持以及日本學術振興會（JSPS）外籍聘用研究員（Invitational Fellowship）項目的支持于2011年和2015年到東京工業大學進行訪問研究。自2001年以來，在國際期刊如European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Part A, Information Sciences, International Journal of Production Economics, International Journal of Production Research, Transportation Research: Part E, Water Resources Research等發表67篇學術論文，李武教授的研究工作得到國内外同行的廣泛引用(SCI/SSCI累計引用2567次，h指數30)，5篇論文先後列為ESI高被引論文，在相關領域産生了一定影響，現任《Group Decision and Negotiation》及多個國際期刊的Associate Editor或編委。
講座主要内容
Large-scale platforms (LSPs) with valuation and awareness advantages have enabled competing small-scale platforms (SSPs) to be embedded in their platforms. This compatibility strategy creates a new channel, the compatible channel, through which customers can purchase services from an SSP via the LSP. Meanwhile, more platforms have been introducing add-on services to enhance their profitability. This study develops stylized game models to characterize the interaction between an LSP and an SSP, and explores their strategic and operational decisions on platform compatibility under add-on services. Our major research findings are as follows. First, we identify the conditions for platform compatibility: compatibility becomes an equilibrium strategy if the proportion of demand through the compatible channel falls within an intermediate range. Second, compatibility has opposite impacts on service pricing: At a low proportion of demand through the compatible channel, the two platforms engage in a price war; otherwise, they both raise prices. Third, we find that homogeneous add-on services stimulate rather than inhibit compatibility due to different foci of the two platforms. Finally, we conduct model extensions to further verify the robustness of the conclusions. Our results provide important implications to the burgeoning debate on when platforms should implement compatibility to achieve a win-win scenario under a variety of settings.
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