講座題目：Strategic Data Disclosure by an Intermediary with Asymmetric Payoffs
主講嘉賓：徐子彬
時 間：2023年5月30日（星期二）上午 9：00—11：00
地 點：商學院116東方廳
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江南大學商學院
2023年5月25日
主講嘉賓簡介
徐子彬畢業于美國南加州大學馬歇爾商學院，目前任香港城市大學深圳研究院副研究員，曾任上海交通大學營銷系助理教授和副教授。研究領域集中在企業決策的量化模型，包括大數據下的個性化定價策略與偏好信息匹配，消費者隐私與數據管控，互聯網平台治理與信息設計等。研究成果在Marketing Science, Management Science, International Journal of Research in Marketing等頂尖期刊發表。他曾主持國家自然科學基金面上項目和青年項目，上海浦江學者基金，并參與國家自然科學基金重點項目，參與創建中國高等院校數字與市場研究專業委員會。此外，他教授《商業數據分析》，《市場博弈與精準營銷》，《營銷模型與工程》等多門本科生，研究生，高管培訓課程，曾獲上海市教學競賽二等獎和南加大年度優秀教學獎。
講座主要内容
Intermediaries often engage in partial information disclosure, which can take the form of either overreporting and underreporting, especially when intermediaries and sellers have asymmetric payoff allocation due to varying responsibilities. This can lead to additional channel conflict beyond the classic double marginalization problem. In this paper, we analyze the roles of partial data disclosure in the channel with asymmetric payoffs by modeling an intermediary which has private access of market information but may either overreport or underreport the market condition to a seller to affect its pricing decision. Our results suggest that partial data disclosure may be optimal only when asymmetric payoff structures are present. Contrary to conventional wisdom, imperfect communication can lead to increased channel profits relative to full disclosure by mitigating the channel conflicts. This is because strategic communication by intermediaries can induce sellers to lower their prices and thus indirectly improve channel coordination.
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