近日，商學院程郁琨教授與北京大學鄧小鐵教授共同撰寫的學術論文“Tight incentive Analysis of Sybil Attacks Against the Market Equilibrium of Resource Exchange over General Networks”在博弈論領域國際頂級期刊《Games and Economic Behavior》發表。程郁琨為本研究的第一作者，江南大學商學院為第一完成單位。
《Games and Economic Behavior》是博弈論領域國際公認的頂級經濟期刊，其研究領域包括但不限于博弈論、經濟學、政治學、生物學、計算機科學、數學、心理學等，具有極強的學術影響力。該論文是國家自然科學基金資助項目的階段性成果。
程郁琨教授緻力于算法博弈論的研究，長期專注于網絡環境下的資源共享博弈機制設計與激勵分析，其成果相繼發表于《中國科學基金》、運籌學領域頂級期刊《Mathematics of Operations Research》、計算機科學領域的權威期刊《IEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing》、計算經濟學領域的國際頂級會議ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC2022)、Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE2017,2024)、人工智能領域的國際重要會議International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI2016)、International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS2020, 2023)等，獲得國家自然科學基金委的4項資助。
Abstract：
The BitTorrent network, a well-known Internet-scale P2P system, applies the proportional response protocol to exchange resource, where each participant contributes resource to neighbors in proportion to the amount it received in the previous round. The dynamics of this protocol is known to converge to a market equilibrium. However, an agent may manipulate this protocol by a Sybil attack to create fictitious identities and control them to gain more benefit. We apply the concept of incentive ratio, the percentage of the new utility after a Sybil attack over the benchmark, to measure the incentive of a strategic agent to play a Sybil attack, proving a tight bound of two over general networks. This finding completes the theoretical picture for incentive analysis on Sybil attacks facing the legendary tit-for-tat protocol for Internet bandwidth sharing and other applications.
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