講座題目：A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Social Responsibility Conduct in Two-echelon Supply Chains主講嘉賓： 李武時 間： 2014年6月19日（星期四）下午13：30—15：30地 點：江南大學文浩科學館107學術報告廳歡迎感興趣的師生前來聆聽！江南大學商學院2014年6月18日主講嘉賓簡介
李武，博士，加拿大溫莎大學商學院管理科學教授。1991年從廈門大學計算機與系統科學系畢業，獲學士學位；1994年在廈門大學系統科學系獲系統工程專業碩士學位；2003年在加拿大滑鐵盧大學系統設計工程系獲工學博士學位。2003-04年在加拿大滑鐵盧大學系統設計工程系從事博士後研究工作；2004年9月至今在溫莎大學商學院任教，并于2011年6月-12月由日本學術振興會外籍聘用研究員項目資助在東京工業大學價值與決策科學系進行訪問研究。主要研究方向包括決策理論與方法、供應鍊管理以及沖突分析等。李武博士的研究獲得兩項加拿大自然科學與工程研究基金會發現基金項目的支持（2006-2011；2012-2017），同時也多次得到國家教育部春晖計劃短期項目支持（2007，2009，2011,2013）。自2001年以來，在Computers and Operations Research , European Journal of Operational Research, IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy Systems, IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A, Information Sciences, International Journal of Production Economics, Journal of the Operational Research Society及Water Resources Research等國際權威期刊發表31篇學術論文。李武博士的研究工作得到國内外同行的廣泛引用(SCI/SSCI累計引用330餘次)，在相關領域産生了較大的影響。 |
講座主要内容This research presentation investigates how two supply chain members, a downstream firm (F) and an upstream supplier (S), interact with each other with respect to corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviour and what impact exogenous parameters may have on this interaction. A game-theoretic analysis is conducted to obtain equilibriums for both simultaneous-move and sequential-move CSR games. Under certain assumptions, it is concluded that (1) there exists a mutual incentivebetween their CSR behaviour, whereby a win-win performance in terms of both CSR and profitability is achieved as long as exogenous parameters exceed certain critical thresholds; (2) A higher consumer marginal social-benefit potential (MSBP) or a lower consumer marginal perception difficulty(MPD)helps to lower the critical thresholds of CSR budgets and CSR operational efficiency by S and F, makingit easier to achieve the win-win performance; (3) An increase in one supply chain member’s CSR budgetor CSR operational efficiency tends to make the supply chaineasier to attain a win-win performance scenario; (4) if CSR decisions are made sequentially, a prior commitment to CSR activities from one supply chain member strengthens the mutual incentive and facilitates the realization of the win-win performance. Business implications of these research findings are also discussed.
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