講座題目：How Add-on Pricing Interacts with Distribution Contracts
主講嘉賓：譚寅亮
講座時間：2023年5月9日（星期二）下午14：00—16：00
講座地點：商學院116東方廳
歡迎感興趣的師生前來聆聽！
江南大學商學院
2023年5月4日
主講嘉賓簡介
譚寅亮博士、美國休斯頓大學鮑爾商學院決策和信息科學終身教授、鮑爾講席教授、供應鍊管理方向系主任、慧與科技數據科學研究中心資深研究員。曾在美國杜蘭大學弗裡曼商學院管理科學方向擔任助理教授，副教授，戈德林國際教育中心行政主任，并獲得終身教授與講席教授職位。譚寅亮博士畢業于美國佛羅裡達大學沃靈頓商學院，學習運營管理及信息系統。他擁有豐富的商業分析方面的教學經驗，獲得過弗裡曼商學院年度最佳教師獎。其研究興趣主要集中在數字經濟，以及科技管理與創新等領域。他在國際頂級期刊Management Science, MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, Production and Operations Management， Decision Science 等發表20餘篇論文，并獲得過國際決策科學年會的最佳論文獎。譚博士現在擔任Production and Operations Management（國際頂級期刊）的資深編輯, Decision Sciences Journal的部門編輯, 以及Information & Management的副編輯和Information Systems Research (ISR)的編委會成員。2019年被評為世界最佳40名40歲以下的商學院教授, 同年他獲得了國際決策科學學會頒發的早期職業成就獎。2022年獲得INFORMS 信息系統學會頒發的 Sandy Slaughter 早期職業成就獎以表彰他對信息系統領域做出的貢獻。
講座主要内容
With the rise of the Internet economy, an increasing number of firms are offering their core products through online platforms, but retail add-ons directly to consumers. Meanwhile, many online platforms have also started adopting the agency (model) contract, where the upstream firms decide the retail prices of products while the downstream platforms take a pre-determined cut from each sale. This study examines the interaction between an upstream firm’s add-on strategy and a downstream online platform’s distribution contract choice. We find that such a firm prefers bundling the add-on and the core product together under the wholesale contract, but prefers retailing the add-on separately under the agency contract. Our research thus is the first to suggest that the distribution contract can critically affect a firm’s choice between add-on pricing and bundling. On the platform side, we show that a higher commission rate does not always result in a higher profit for the platform under the agency contract. We further identify two conditions under which the platform prefers the agency contract over the wholesale contract: The commission rate for the platform cannot be too low, and the market potential of the add-on cannot be too large. For the overall channel, we show that the interaction between add-on pricing and distribution contracts leads to sub-optimal channel performance. That said, it is possible for both the firm and the platform to obtain higher profits under the agency contract than under the wholesale contract. Finally, we also demonstrate the robustness of our findings under several alternative model specifications.
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